THE INCONSEQUENTIAL CHOICE-OF-LAW
QUESTION POSED BY JESNER V. ARAB BANK
Beth Van Schaack*
In Jesner v. Arab Bank,1 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court has
taken up the question of whether victims of human rights abuses can sue
corporations and other legal entities for violations of the law of nations
under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).2 In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co. (Kiobel I), the Second Circuit ruled that they cannot because—by its
analysis—international law does not affirmatively provide for corporate tort
liability.3 By contrast, all the other circuits to consider the issue have ruled
or assumed that such cases can go forward in U.S. courts,4 yielding a
decidedly lopsided circuit split.5 Indeed, the Second Circuit itself is now
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1.
In re Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort Statute Litig., 808 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2015); see also
Jesner v. Arab Bank, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/jesner-v-arab-bankplc/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2017).
2.
The First Congress enacted the ATS as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which created
the federal court system; it states that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”
Alien’s Action for Tort, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
3.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Kiobel I”), aff’d on
other grounds. See also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013) (“Kiobel II”).
4.
See, e.g., In re Arab Bank, 808 F.3d at 151 (“[O]n the issue of corporate liability under the
ATS, Kiobel I now appears to swim alone against the tide.”); Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc.,
758 F.3d 516, 530–31 (4th Cir. 2014); Doe v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2014),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 527 App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 57
(D.C. Cir. 2011); Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008).
5.
There is some irony to the fact that the Second Circuit now stands as the only circuit to
hold firm to this conclusion. In an era when its judges were less hostile to ATS litigation, it was the
Second Circuit that launched the corporate cases in the first place. In Kadic v. Karadžiü, 70 F.3d 232
(2d Cir. 1995), the defendant Radovan Karadžiü argued that he could not be sued for many of the causes
of action alleged because he was a private citizen. Curiously, he also argued—in an inconsistent
alternative—that he was head of state of the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska and was thus entitled to
immunity. In an opinion evincing a sophisticated understanding of international law, the Second Circuit
concluded that some causes of action under international law require a showing of state action as an
element of the offense—such as the prohibition against torture—whereas others are undifferentiated and
apply equally to non-state actors—such as the prohibitions against genocide and crimes against
humanity. Id. at 239–40. Indeed, U.S. courts have also made clear that still other international rules are
oriented towards non-state actors, such as the prohibitions on terrorism and piracy. See Ali Shafi v.
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subject to an intra-circuit split, with subsequent panels “grudgingly”
following Kiobel I, while urging their brethren to abandon an increasingly
isolated position.6
Inherent to the dispute at hand is an a priori choice-of-law issue:
Should courts look to international law or federal common law to resolve
the question presented? While the Supreme Court established that
international law provides the elements of plaintiffs’ substantive cause of
action in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,7 the Court did not specify which body
of law governs ancillary rules of decision8—such as the standards for aiding
and abetting liability9 or the rules governing statutes of limitation, damages,
standing, personal jurisdiction, and the like.10 As such, some judges have
looked to federal common law (or to U.S. choice-of-law rules) to answer
these questions that go beyond the strict contours of the plaintiff’s cause of
action.11 Although contentious, this choice-of-law debate proves to be
inconsequential when it comes to the availability of corporate tort liability,
given that both bodies of law point in the same direction and hand victory,
Palestinian Auth., 642 F.3d 1088, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[P]iracy in violation of the law of nations is
by definition perpetrated by nonstate actors.”) (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 163, n.h
(1820)). By recognizing that some international law prohibitions govern private actors, the Second
Circuit effectively opened the door to suits against corporate entities.
6.
In connection with the denial of en banc review in Jesner, several Second Circuit judges
indicated their disappointment that the Circuit “yet again missed an opportunity to correct the panel’s
majority opinion” in Kiobel I. In re Arab Bank, Plc Alien Tort Statute Litigation, 822 F.3d 34, 40–41
(2d Cir. 2016) (Pooler, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). Subsequent Second Circuit
panels have considered themselves bound by Kiobel I per Second Circuit practice. See Jones v.
Coughlin, 45 F.3d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that a decision by a panel of the
Second Circuit “is binding unless and until it is overruled by the Court en banc or the Supreme Court”).
7.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004) (holding that the ATS enables
“federal courts to hear claims in a very limited category defined by the law of nations and recognized at
common law”).
8.
See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 965–66 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring), vacated by Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003) (making a distinction
between the underlying tort of summary execution alleged to have been committed by the Burmese
military from the “ancillary legal question” of the corporate defendant’s liability as an accessory). That
case settled while the en banc review was pending.
9.
See, e.g., Chimène I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 61, 64 (2008) (arguing that the aiding and abetting standard is a conduct-regulating norm
that should be governed by customary international law under Sosa in contradistinction to other
secondary rules of decision governed by domestic law).
10.
Paul L. Hoffman & Daniel A. Zaheer, The Rules of the Road: Federal Common Law and
Aiding and Abetting Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 47, 52
(2003) (noting disagreement around how to identify the body of law that should answer “such nuts and
bolts questions”).
11.
See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 284 (2d Cir. 2007) (per
curiam) (Hall, J., concurring); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1202 (9th Cir. 2007).
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at least in this round, to the plaintiffs. In other words, regardless of whether
courts look to U.S. law or to international law, the ATS supports corporate
tort liability.
By way of background, in Sosa, the Supreme Court ended a
longstanding academic debate by characterizing the ATS as “in terms only
jurisdictional.”12 Nonetheless, it found that the statute provides a “limited,
implicit sanction to entertain the handful of international law cum common
law claims understood in 1789.”13 The Court then set out the methodology
to be employed to determine which causes of action are actionable under
the ATS: claims brought under the ATS must “rest on a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms,” such
as piracy, offenses against ambassadors, or violations of safe conduct.14
The choice-of-law exercise presented by Jesner turns in part on how courts
should construe an enigmatic footnote in Sosa.15 There, the Court noted
that whether an international norm satisfies this test gives rise to a “related
consideration”: “whether international law extends the scope of liability for
a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is
a private actor such as a corporation or individual.”16
Corporate defendants and their supporters contend that international
law speaks to the question of who or what kind of actor can violate
international law. Accordingly, it is argued, the footnote dictates that the
international law delict invoked by the plaintiff must itself be specifically
addressed to corporate defendants.17 This is the position adopted by the
Kiobel I majority, which ruled that international law must affirmatively
extend liability to “a particular class of defendant[s], such as
corporations,”18 and that corporate liability did not meet the Sosa standard
because “[n]o corporation has ever been subject to any form of liability
(whether civil, criminal, or otherwise) under the customary international

12.

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712.

13.

Id.

14.

Id. at 694, 725. See also id. at 732 (reaffirming standard).

15.

Id. at 732.

16.

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732.

17.
Brief for Respondent On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, 15, 21, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 137 S.Ct. 1432 (2017) (No. 16–499) http://www
.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/16-499-bs.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2018) [hereinafter
Jesner].
18.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 127 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Kiobel I”), aff’d
on other grounds.
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law of human rights.”19 This camp makes much of the fact that there are
few international fora that assert jurisdiction—criminal or civil—over legal
persons for breaches of international law and point in particular to the
unsurprising fact that none of the international criminal tribunals convened
from Nuremberg onward has exercised criminal jurisdiction over
corporations for international law violations.20
By contrast, plaintiffs and their supporters interpret footnote 20 to be
making a distinction between private actors and state actors—given that
some international law norms require a showing of state action as a
constitutive element of the offense21—rather than suggesting that there are
different classes of private actors that may not be amenable to suit for any
cause of action at all. They argue that, in any case, the question of which
private actors may be subject to tort liability should be resolved according
to standard domestic law tort principles, on the theory that while
international law addresses substantive standards of conduct, it leaves
procedural modes of enforcement to individual states.22 In Kiobel I, Judge
Leval urged this approach in his concurrence, reasoning that international
law contains less developed liability rules and so “leaves the manner of
enforcement . . . almost entirely to individual nations.”23 Reasoning that
ATS cases are—at base—tort cases,24 plaintiffs often argue that default
federal common law rules governing the tort liability of corporations and

19.

Id. at 148.

20.

Jesner, supra note 17, at 24–26.

21.
For example, the conventional prohibition against torture requires a showing that the
prohibited acts are “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity.” Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465
U.N.T.S. 85. See Kadic v. Karadžiü, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Ali Shafi v. Palestinian Auth.,
642 F.3d 1088, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
22.
An analogy can be drawn to choice-of-law rules in diversity actions in the United States.
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471–72 (1965) (discussing importance of differentiating between
rules that modify substantive rights and those that affect the administration of remedies in the context of
choice-of-law determinations in federal diversity cases); see also id. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring)
(arguing courts should consider whether “the choice of rule would substantially affect those primary
decisions respecting human conduct which our constitutional system leaves to state regulation”).
23.

Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 152 (Leval, J., concurring).

24.
See Richard Herz, Symposium: It’s Just a Tort Case, SCOTUSBLOG (July 27, 2017, 2:24
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/07/symposium-just-tort-case/.
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other legal entities should apply25 absent compelling reasons for
departure.26
The Second Circuit’s observation about the lack of corporate liability
before international criminal courts is, of course, largely true,27 although
there are some important exceptions. Starting with the World War II
(WWII) era, defendants overlook the fact that the Nuremberg Tribunal did
exercise a form of enterprise liability by declaring certain Nazi
organizations to be criminal.28 By contrast, today’s ad hoc international
criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, East
Timor, and Cambodia only assert criminal jurisdiction over natural persons

25.
Plaintiffs also point out that the same result is reached with a strictly textual read of the
ATS, which identifies the class of plaintiffs who can sue but not the class of defendants that can be sued,
implying that there are no limits on the latter.
26.
In addition to being amenable to tort liability as a matter of course, corporations can
conceivably be charged for many international crimes codified in U.S. law. For example, Title 18’s
prohibitions on torture, war crimes, and recruiting child soldiers encompass legal persons in addition to
natural persons. See, e.g., Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal years 1994 & 1995, 18 U.S.C. §
2340 (1994) (“Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit torture shall . . . .”);
War Crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 2441(a) (2006) (holding accountable “whoever . . . commits a war crime”); 18
U.S.C. § 2442 (2008) (applying to “whoever knowingly . . . .”); Words Denoting Number, Gender, and
So Forth, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (defining “whoever” to include “corporations, companies, associations,
firms, partnerships . . . as well as individuals”).
27.
There is no international tribunal dedicated to holding either corporations or natural
persons civilly liable for international law violations. The International Court of Justice exercises civil
jurisdiction, but only over claims between states. See Statute of International Court of Justice, 1945
I.C.J, ch.II, at art. 34 (Oct. 24) [hereinafter I.C.J.]. Likewise, the human rights treaty bodies call states
to account, although signatories do have obligations not only to “respect” human rights but also to
“ensure” that individuals within their territories and jurisdiction enjoy those rights, which allows states
to be held liable for insufficiently preventing or responding to harm caused by non-state actors,
including corporations. See Human Rights Committee, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, General Comment No. 31 [80], ¶ 8, 18th Sess., U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004) (“[T]he positive obligations on States Parties to ensure
Covenant rights will only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not just against
violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by private persons or entities
that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights in so far as they are amenable to application
between private persons or entities.”).
28.
See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 501 (1st ed. 1992)
(discussing criminal indictment of Nazi organizations). The World War II-era tribunals also prosecuted
corporate principals for international crimes and dissolved a number of corporations that participated in
or benefited from such criminality in order to pay reparations to victims. In obiter dicta, the tribunals
made clear that they considered corporations to be capable of violating international law and to being
held accountable for doing so. See generally Brief for Nuremberg Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Jesner v. Arab Bank, No. 16-499 (U.S. June 27, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/07/16-499-tsac-Nuremberg-Scholars-rev.pdf.
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given the terms of their constitutive statutes.29 In dicta, however, these
tribunals have on occasion indicated that they consider legal persons—such
as paramilitary organizations and business entities—to be capable of
violating international law.30 For example, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda clearly considered Radio Télévision Libre des Mille
Collines to be responsible for instigating genocide, although it could only
convict individual principals of the organization due to constraints
contained within its statute.31
Drafters of the treaty establishing the permanent International
Criminal Court (ICC) considered empowering the ICC to prosecute
corporations involved in international crimes in connection with a proposal
tabled by France.32 However, as explained in an amicus curiae brief by the
former head of the United States delegation to the treaty drafting
negotiations,33 states could not reach consensus on how such liability would
operate and what penalties would follow a finding of guilt, particularly
given the high degree of variation within national systems, the fact that
imprisonment would be the primary form of punishment available to the
Court, and the short time allotted for the negotiations.34 As a result, the
ICC can exercise jurisdiction only over natural persons per Article 25.35
During the negotiations, there was no consideration given to corporate civil
liability, given that such a concept was outside the scope of the project to
construct an international criminal court.36 In the process by which the ICC
29.
See, e.g., Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia art. 6, May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192.
30.
The International Court of Justice recognizes that corporations can have an “independent
and distinct legal personality” under international law. See Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem.
Rep. Congo), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 582, at 605 (May 24); Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd.
(Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, at 33–39 (Feb. 5) (looking to municipal (domestic) law to determine
Belgium’s standing to sue on behalf of Belgian shareholders of a corporation injured during the Spanish
Civil War). The U.S. Supreme Court has cited Barcelona Traction in a case involving expropriation
claims arising under international law brought by a corporation. First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para el
Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 623, 630 (1983).
31.
Nahimana et al. v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 99-52-A, Judgement, ¶ 498 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for Rwanda Nov. 28, 2007) (discussing RTLM’s instigation of genocide).
32.
See Harmen van der Wilt, Corporate Criminal Responsibility for International Crimes:
Exploring the Possibilities, 12 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 43, 43 (2013) (discussing French proposal).
33.
Brief for Ambassador David J. Sheffer, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law,
as Amicus Curiae In Support of the Petitioners, 8–10, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 137 S.Ct. 1432 (June
26, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/16-499-tsac-davidjscheffer.pdf
[hereinafter Sheffer].
34.
35.
17, 1998).
36.

Id.
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, art. 25, ¶ 1 (July
Sheffer, supra note 33, at 10.
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and other international criminal tribunals were established, there was never
a question of whether corporate liability—civil or criminal—was legally
available to states; the decision to exclude reference to corporate liability
was based upon logistical and policy concerns, rather than the existence of
any legal impediment. Nonetheless, as states have ratified the treaty that
created the ICC, they have incorporated a range of international crimes into
their domestic legal frameworks and made them applicable to corporate
entities in addition to natural persons.37
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon offers an interesting
counterexample of an international court asserting criminal jurisdiction over
legal entities. Although devoted to prosecuting acts of terrorism under
Lebanese law, it recently held that it had inherent jurisdiction over juridical
persons accused of contempt—specifically media outlets that released the
names of protected witnesses—because the operative provision (Rule 60
bis) applied to all “persons.”38 That conviction was confirmed by the
Appeals Chamber, which issued an exhaustive and erudite survey of
international and domestic law that concluded that corporate liability, both
civil and criminal, is a general principle of law,39 one of the sources of
international law recognized by the International Court of Justice40 and the
United States Supreme Court.41 Further, the African Union has recently
promulgated a draft statute for an African Court of Justice and Human
Rights, not yet in force, that would include a penal chamber with
jurisdiction over legal persons (Article 46C), upon “proof that it was the
policy of the corporation to do the act which constituted the offense.”42
The absence of international criminal jurisdiction over corporations
does not signify that international law does not govern corporate conduct.
Bilateral43 and multilateral treaties increasingly govern corporate conduct or
37.
See, e.g., W. Cory Wanless, Corporate Liability for International Crimes Under Canada’s
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 201 (2009).
38.
New TV S.A.L. & Ms. Karma Al Khayat, 2 Oct. 2014, Case No. STL 1405/PT/AP/AR126.1, ¶¶ 36–42 (Leb.).
39.

Id. ¶¶ 51–67.

40.

I.C.J., supra note 27, at art. 38.

41.
First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 623
(1983); see also id. at 628–29 (holding that “the principles governing this case are common to both
international law and federal common law, which in these circumstances is necessarily informed both by
international law principles and by articulated congressional policies”).
42.
See Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice
and Human Rights, June 27, 2014, A.U. Doc. No. Assembly/AU/Dec.529 (XXIII).
43.
See Tara Van Ho, International Legal Personality of Corporations: How Investment Law
Answers the Supreme Court Question in Jesner, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.justsecurity
.org/45543/international-legal-personality-corporations-investment-law-answers-supreme-courtquestion
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empower and/or oblige their signatories to implement a full range of
remedies for corporate breaches. Most importantly for the Jesner case is
the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism. This treaty explicitly states at Article 5 that, “[e]ach State Party
. . . shall take the necessary measures to enable a legal entity located in its
territory or organized under its laws to be held liable when a person
responsible for the management or control of that legal entity has, . . .
committed an offen[s]e” in violation of the Convention, including by
funding terrorist activities.44 At Article 18, the treaty also requires member
states to prohibit the “illegal activities of persons and organizations that
knowingly encourage, instigate, organize or engage in the commission” of
acts in violation of the treaty.45 Upon ratification, the United States
implemented this treaty with the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act,46
invoked in the Jesner case by the U.S. citizen plaintiffs who prevailed in
their action at trial following the severance of their case from that of the
alien plaintiffs.47 In the immediate aftermath of the attacks of September
11th, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council, in an effort sponsored by
the United States government, adopted a binding resolution obliging all
states to implement the suite of terrorism treaties already in existence,
including the Terrorist Financing Convention, by inter alia criminalizing
acts of terrorism and terrorist financing within their domestic legal
systems.48 The terms of the Terrorist Financing Treaty are now effectively
binding on all U.N. member states by virtue of their U.N. Charter
obligations to implement Chapter VII resolutions.49
Treaties addressed to other international and transnational law
violations also mandate the imposition of corporate liability and a range of
penalties, reflecting the role business entities play in perpetrating and
enabling these violations. Examples include treaties devoted to combating
-jesner/ (noting that international investment law delineates international rights and responsibilities for
corporations, which, as a matter of public international law, are distinct from their shareholders).
44.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999,
2178 U.N.T.S. 197 (adopted by the General Assembly in Resolution 54/109 of 9 Dec. 1999).
45.
Id. at art. 18. See also Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism art.
10, May 16, 2005, C.E.T.S. No. 196.
46.

Civil Remedies, 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2016).

47.
The case is Linde v. Arab Bank PLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 287, 298–99 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). A
jury found for the plaintiffs in Linde; the bank settled before the district court could set damages.
Elements of the settlement are before the Second Circuit. See Nate Raymond & Joseph Ax, Arab Bank
Settles U.S. Litigation Over Attacks by Militants, REUTERS (Aug. 14, 2015, 3:11 PM), https://uk.reuters.
com/article/uk-arab-bank-jo-settlement-hamas/arab-bank-settles-u-s-litigation-over-attacks-by-militantsidUKKCN0QJ21A20150814.
48.

S.C. Res. 1373 ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).

49.

U.N. Charter art. 25.
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transnational organized crime,50 human and other forms of trafficking,51 and
bribery.52 Some of these treaties place enforcement obligations on states;
others impose international obligations on legal entities themselves.53
Likewise, a treaty dedicated to crimes against humanity being drafted by
the U.N. International Law Commission envisions corporate liability for
breaches.54 Together, these international instruments attest to the fact that
international law contains no categorical bar to the exercise of domestic
jurisdiction over corporations when they commit violations of international
law. Accordingly, states are free to adopt a variety of responses to
corporate malfeasance, including criminal sanctions and civil suits, such as
those proceeding under the ATS. As such, the fact that most international
war crimes tribunals do not assert criminal jurisdiction over legal entities is
not dispositive of the question presented in Jesner.
The choice-of-law decision is thus inconsequential. Whether domestic
law or international law governs the question presented in Jesner should
land the Court in the same place: Corporate tort liability is a standard
feature of domestic law and there is nothing in international law that would
prevent the United States from providing a tort remedy for corporate
breaches of international law under the ATS. That said, preserving
corporate liability will not result in an immediate win for the plaintiffs in
Jesner. There are a number of other grounds upon which this case could be
resolved for defendants, including on prudential political question or comity
grounds.55
Furthermore, the Kiobel II presumption against

50.
See, e.g., United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, annex, 1
art. 10(2), Nov. 15, 2000, T.I.A.S. 13127, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209 (indicating that “[s]ubject to the legal
principles of the State Party, the liability of legal persons may be criminal, civil or administrative.” See
also Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal art. 2(14), Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 57 (defining “person” to include legal persons).
51.
See Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings art.
22, May 16, 2005, C.E.T.S. 197 (“Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to ensure that a legal person can be held liable for a criminal offence established in
accordance with this Convention.”).
52.
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions art. 2, Nov. 21, 1997, S. Treaty No. 105-43, 2802 U.N.T.S. 285 (“Each Party shall take
such measures as may be necessary, in accordance with its legal principles, to establish the liability of
legal persons for the bribery of a foreign public official.”).
53.
treaties).

See Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1020 (7th Cir. 2013) (listing

54.
See Sean Murphy, Corporate Liability and Crimes Against Humanity, JUST SECURITY
(Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/46242/corporate-liability-crimes-humanity/.
55.
The fact that this case involves the ever-controversial Middle East should not prompt the
Court to craft an overly broad rule of corporate immunity; rather, the Court should leave it for the lower
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extraterritoriality remains to be considered and particularly the question of
whether automated transactions that route through the United States touch
and concern this country with sufficient force to displace the presumption
against extraterritoriality.56 An overly broad and categorical rule of
corporate immunity, without basis in domestic or international law, is a
poor vehicle to address any such concerns that might be raised by this
litigation. Rather, the Court should continue to leave the door open to
corporate liability under the ATS57 and remand to allow the lower courts to
address remaining arguments as to why plaintiffs should, or should not,
recover for the proven harm that has befallen them on account of the Arab
Bank’s actions.58

courts to consider the unique facts of the case, and particularly the importance of the U.S.-Jordan
bilateral relationship, through a case-specific application of such principles.
56.

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013) (“Kiobel II”).

57.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004) (holding that “the judicial power
[under the ATS] should be exercised on the understanding that the door is still ajar subject to vigilant
doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of international norms today.”).
58.

See Raymond & Ax, supra note 47.

